# **Adversarial Attack and Defense for Non-Parametric Two-Sample Tests**

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**Motivation**: Non-parametric two-sample tests (TSTs) have been widely applied to analysing critical data in physics<sup>[1]</sup>, neurophysiology<sup>[2]</sup>, biology<sup>[3]</sup>, etc. Adversarial robustness of non-parametric TSTs has not been studied so far, despite its extensive studies for deep neural networks.

**Our contribution:** We undertake the pioneer study on adversarial robustness of non-parametric TSTs.

- We propose a generic **ensemble attack** framework which uncovers the failure mode of non-parametric TSTs and reveals non-parametric TSTs are adversarially vulnerable.
- To counteract the threats incurred by adversarial attacks, we propose to adversarially learn kernels for non-parametric TSTs, which makes TSTs more reliable in critical applications.

# **Adversarial Attacks Against Non-Parametric TSTs**



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# **Problem Formulation**

Non-parametric TST is a basic tool to judge whether two sets of samples are drawn from the same distribution.



How can a TST make the judgement?

The test compares the test statistic with a particular threshold: if the threshold is exceeded, then the test accepts the alternative hypothesis  $(\mathcal{H}_1: \mathbb{P} \neq \mathbb{Q})$ ; otherwise, accepts the null hypothesis  $(\mathcal{H}_0: \mathbb{P} = \mathbb{Q})$ .

Three key components of non-parametric TSTs:

- Test statistic  $\mathcal{D}(S_{\mathbb{P}}, S_{\mathbb{Q}})$  --- the differences between the mean embedding based on a parameterized kernel for each distribution, e.g., maximum mean discrepancy<sup>[4]</sup> (MMD).
- Test criterion  $\hat{\mathcal{F}}(S_{\mathbb{P}}, S_{\mathbb{Q}}; k)$  --- a non-parametric TST optimizes its learnable parameters via maximizing its test criterion, thus approximately maximizing the lower bound of its test power.

**Potential risk** that causes a malfunction of a non-parametric TST:

- The attacker aims to deteriorate the test's test power.
- 2. The attacker can craft an adversarial pair  $(S_{\mathbb{P}}, \tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}})$  as the input to the test during the testing procedure.
- 3. The two sets  $\tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}}$  and  $S_{\mathbb{Q}}$  should be nearly indistinguishable --- we assume the adversarial perturbation is  $l_{\infty}$ -bounded.

## **Theoretical analysis**

- (Proposition 1) An  $l_{\infty}$ -bounded adversary can make adversarial perturbation imperceptible, thus guaranteeing the attack's invisibility.
- (Theorem 2) The test power of a non-parametric TST could be further degraded in the adversarial setting.

**Proposition 1.** Under Assumptions 1 to 3, we use  $n_{\rm tr}$  sam-Theorem 2. In the setup of Proposition 1, given  $\hat{\theta}_{n_{\rm tr}} =$ ples to train a kernel  $k_{\theta}$  parameterized with  $\theta$  and  $n_{\text{te}}$  sam-  $\arg \max_{\theta \in \bar{\Theta}_s} \hat{\mathcal{F}}(k_{\theta})$ ,  $r^{(n_{\text{te}})}$  denoting the rejection threshples to run a test of significance level  $\alpha$ . Given the adver- old,  $\mathcal{F}^* = \sup_{\theta \in \overline{\Theta}_s} \mathcal{F}(k_{\theta})$ , and constants  $C_1, C_2, C_3$  desarial budget  $\epsilon \geq 0$ , the benign pair  $(S_{\mathbb{P}}, S_{\mathbb{Q}})$  and the corpending on  $\nu, L_1, \lambda, s, R_{\Theta}$  and  $\kappa$ , with probability at least responding adversarial pair  $(S_{\mathbb{P}}, \tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}})$  where  $\tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}} \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}[S_{\mathbb{Q}}]$ ,  $1 - \delta$ , the test under adversarial attack has power with the probability at least  $1 - \delta$ , we have

 $\Pr(n_{ ext{te}} \widehat{ ext{MMD}}^2(S_{\mathbb{P}}, ilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}}; k_{\hat{ heta}_{n_{ ext{tr}}}}) > r^{(n_{ ext{te}})}) \ge \Phi \left| \sqrt{n_{ ext{te}}} \Big( \mathcal{F}^* - \right) \right|$ 

 $\frac{C_1}{\sqrt{n_{\rm tr}}} \sqrt{\log \frac{\sqrt{n_{\rm tr}}}{\delta}} - \frac{C_2 L_2 \epsilon \sqrt{d}}{\sqrt{n_{\rm to}}} \sqrt{\log \frac{\sqrt{n_{\rm te}}}{\delta}} - C_3 \sqrt{\log \frac{1}{\alpha}} \right].$ 


$$\begin{split} \sup_{\theta} |\widehat{\mathrm{MMD}}^{2}(S_{\mathbb{P}}, \tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}}; k_{\theta}) - \widehat{\mathrm{MMD}}^{2}(S_{\mathbb{P}}, S_{\mathbb{Q}}; k_{\theta})| \\ & \leq \frac{8L_{2}\epsilon\sqrt{d}}{\sqrt{n_{\mathrm{te}}}} \sqrt{2\log\frac{2}{\delta} + 2\kappa\log(4\mathrm{R}_{\Theta}\sqrt{n_{\mathrm{te}}})} + \frac{8L_{1}}{\sqrt{n_{\mathrm{te}}}}. \end{split}$$

## **Generation of adversarial pairs**

We propose TST-agnostic ensemble attack --- search for the adversarial set  $\tilde{S}_{\mathbb{O}}$  via minimizing a weighted sum of test criteria.

$$\tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}} = \argmin_{\tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}} \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}[S_{\mathbb{Q}}]} \sum_{w^{(\mathcal{J}_i)} \in \mathbb{W}, \hat{\mathcal{F}}^{(\mathcal{J}_i)} \in \hat{\mathbb{F}}} w^{(\mathcal{J}_i)} \hat{\mathcal{F}}^{(\mathcal{J}_i)}(S_{\mathbb{P}}, \tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}})$$

An example of adversarial pair  $(S_{\mathbb{P}}, \tilde{S}_{\mathbb{O}})$ generated by embedding an adversarial



• Test power --- the probability of correctly rejecting  $\mathcal{H}_0$  against a particular number of inputs from  $\mathcal{H}_1$ .

# **Defending Non-Parametric TSTs**

### **Adversarially learning kernels for non-parametric TSTs**

 The learning objective of robust kernels is formulated as a max-min optimization:

 $\hat{\theta} \approx rg\max_{\theta} \min_{\tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}} \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}[S_{\mathbb{Q}}]} \hat{\mathcal{F}}(S_{\mathbb{P}}, \tilde{S}_{\mathbb{Q}}; k_{\theta})$ 

• Our defense is based on deep kernels, i.e., robust deep kernels for non-parametric TSTs (MMD-RoD).

Algorithm 2 Adversarially Learning Deep Kernels

- 1: Input: benign pair  $(S_{\mathbb{P}}, S_{\mathbb{Q}})$ , maximum PGD step T, adversarial budget  $\epsilon$ , checkpoint  $\mathbb{C} = \{c_0, \ldots, c_n\},\$ deep kernel  $k_{\theta}^{(\text{RoD})}$  parameterized by  $\theta$ , training epochs E, learning rate  $\eta$
- 2: **Output:** parameters of robust deep kernel  $\theta$
- 3: for e = 1 to E do
- 4:  $X \leftarrow \text{minibatch from } S_{\mathbb{P}}; Y \leftarrow \text{minibatch from } S_{\mathbb{Q}}$
- Generate an adversarial pair  $(X, \tilde{Y})$  by Algorithm 1 5:
- with setting  $\hat{\mathbb{F}} = \{\hat{\mathcal{F}}^{(\text{RoD})}(\cdot, \cdot; k_{\theta}^{(\text{RoD})})\}$
- $\theta \leftarrow \theta + \eta \nabla_{\theta} \hat{\mathcal{F}}^{(\text{RoD})}(X, \tilde{Y}; k_{a}^{(\text{RoD})})$ 6: 7: end for

# **Experiments**

#### Test power evaluated under ensemble attacks

 Many existing non-parametric TSTs suffer from severe adversarial vulnerabilities.

Table 1. We report the average test power of six typical non-parametric TSTs ( $\alpha = 0.05$ ) as well as Ensemble on five benchmark datasets in benign and adversarial settings, respectively. The lower the test power under attacks is, the more adversarially vulnerable is the TST.

| шu | in beingh and adversarial settings, respectively. The lower the test power under attacks is, the more adversarianty vulnerable is the 151. |            |             |    |                     |                               |                               |                                 |                                 |  |                                 |
|----|--|------------|-------------|----|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
|    | Datasets   | $\epsilon$ | $n_{ m te}$ | EA | MMD-D               | MMD-G                         | C2ST-S                        | C2ST-L                          | ME                              | SCF                                      | Ensemble                        |
| _  | Blob   | 0.05       | 100         | ×  | $1.000 \pm 0.000$   | $1.000{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $1.000{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               | $0.992{\scriptstyle\pm0.002}$   | $0.962{\scriptstyle\pm0.001}$            | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               |
|    |  |            |             |    | <b>0.131</b> ±0.007 | <b>0.099</b> ±0.003           | $0.021 \pm 0.003$             | $0.715{\scriptstyle \pm 0.091}$ | $0.154 \pm 0.011$               | $\textbf{0.098}{\scriptstyle \pm 0.022}$ | $0.846 \pm 0.030$               |
| _  | HDGM   | 0.05       | 3000        | X  | $1.000 \pm 0.000$   | $1.000{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $1.000{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               | $1.000 \pm 0.002$               | $0.942{\scriptstyle\pm0.013}$            | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               |
|    |  |            |             |    | 0.259±0.009         | <b>0.081</b> ±0.003           | $0.105{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | <b>0.090</b> ±0.000             | <b>0.500</b> ±0.025             | <b>0.006</b> ±0.000                      | $0.734{\scriptstyle \pm 0.078}$ |
| _  | Higgs  | 0.05       | 5000        | X  | $1.000 \pm 0.000$   | $1.000{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $0.970{\scriptstyle\pm0.002}$ | $0.984{\scriptstyle\pm0.003}$   | $0.830{\scriptstyle \pm 0.042}$ | $0.675{\scriptstyle\pm0.071}$            | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               |
|    |  |            |             |    | <b>0.027</b> ±0.001 | $0.002{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $0.065{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | <b>0.080</b> ±0.006             | <b>0.263</b> ±0.022             | $0.058{\scriptstyle\pm0.005}$            | $0.422 \pm 0.013$               |
| _  | MNIST  | 0.05       | 500         | X  | $1.000 \pm 0.000$   | $0.904{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $1.000{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               | $0.386{\scriptstyle \pm 0.005}$          | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               |
|    |  |            |             |    | <b>0.087</b> ±0.040 | $0.102{\scriptstyle\pm0.002}$ | $0.003{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$ | $0.005{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$   | <b>0.062</b> ±0.002             | $0.001{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$            | $0.213{\scriptstyle \pm 0.026}$ |
| (  | CIFAR-10   | 0.0314     | 500         | X  | $1.000 \pm 0.000$   | $1.000 \pm 0.000$             | $1.000 \pm 0.000$             | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               | $0.033{\scriptstyle \pm 0.001}$          | $1.000 \pm 0.000$               |
|    |  |            |             |    | <b>0.187</b> ±0.001 | <b>0.279</b> ±0.004           | <b>0.107</b> ±0.017           | $0.119{\scriptstyle \pm 0.021}$ | $0.079{\scriptstyle\pm0.000}$   | <b>0.000</b> ±0.000                      | $0.429{\scriptstyle\pm0.005}$   |



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#### **Robustness of MMD-RoD**

• MMD-RoD can significantly enhance the robustness of non-parametric TSTs without sacrificing the test power in the benign setting on most tasks such as MNIST and CIFAR-10.

Table 2. Test power of MMD-RoD and Ensemble<sup>+</sup>.

|                       |    | <b>1</b>                      |                               |                               |                   |                               |
|-----------------------|----|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|
|                       | EA | Blob                          | HDGM                          | Higgs                         | MNIST             | CIFAR-10                      |
| MMD-RoD               | ×  | 1.00±0.00                     | $0.61 {\pm} 0.07$             | $0.53 \pm 0.00$               | <b>1.00</b> ±0.12 | <b>1.00</b> ±0.00             |
| MIMD-KOD              |    | $0.19{\scriptstyle \pm 0.06}$ | $0.00 {\pm} 0.01$             | $0.23{\scriptstyle \pm 0.02}$ | <b>0.98</b> ±0.00 | $0.91{\scriptstyle \pm 0.00}$ |
| Ensemble <sup>+</sup> | X  | $1.00 \pm 0.00$               | $1.00 \pm 0.00$               | $1.00 \pm 0.00$               | $1.00 \pm 0.00$   | $1.00 \pm 0.00$               |
| Ensemble              |    | <b>0.89</b> ±0.01             | $0.73{\scriptstyle \pm 0.08}$ | $0.54{\scriptstyle \pm 0.04}$ | <b>0.98</b> ±0.00 | $0.95 \pm 0.00$               |

- Limitation: MMD-RoD unexpectedly perform poorly on HDGM and Higgs datasets, which has low test power in the benign and adversarial settings.
- We leave further improving the adversarial robustness of non-parametric TSTs as future work.

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